The reckoning Arvada is sitting inside
Arvada's contract does not renew in a vacuum. Over roughly eighteen months, Colorado has produced a detailed record of what happens to plate-reader data once it leaves the city that collected it, and has declined to write a law about it.
How much of Colorado is watched
Flock Safety holds contracts with nearly 100 Colorado law enforcement agencies, plus more than 160 private entities and community-safety organizations in the state.[1] The crowdsourced OpenStreetMap dataset behind DeFlock recorded roughly 2,600 plate-reader cameras statewide as of mid-August 2026, itself an undercount.[2] Arvada's own order form describes Flock's nationwide lookup network as “boasting 10 billion additional plate reads per month.”[14]
Inside Jefferson County, Arvada's neighbors have deployed, and in two cases already reversed course:
| Jurisdiction | Reported cameras | Who said so |
|---|---|---|
| Arvada | 15 (city contract) + 1 Falcon Flex | The city's own 2025 contract, obtained under CORA. Flock Safety's figure, as reported by Westword, was 16.[14][4] |
| Lakewood | 16 (city contract) | Council voted unanimously on September 21, 2026 not to renew; the contract ends January 30, 2027.[17] |
| Unincorporated Jefferson County | “More than two dozen” since 2024 | Jefferson County[4] |
| Golden | ~20, from late 2021 | Denver7, reported at the time[4] |
| Edgewater | Contract confirmed | Reported contract; count not published[3] |
| Denver (adjacent) | 111, now zero | Flock Safety; removal reported by 9News[4][5] |
The Colorado cases
The concerns residents raise about Flock trace to documented Colorado and national incidents, not to speculation. These are the incidents.
Denver: 1,400+ immigration-related searches
Audit logs reported by Colorado Newsline show Denver's Flock data touched by more than 1,400 immigration-related national searches between June 2024 and April 2025, roughly 690 of them after the January 2025 inauguration. Logged justifications included “ICE” and “immigration.” Denver had not authorized this; the searches came through the national network.[6]
Loveland: data reached Border Patrol
Records revealed the Loveland Police Department shared access to its Flock data with U.S. Border Patrol, with ICE reportedly reaching it via Loveland police and the ATF. Loveland was subsequently barred from the network. This is the mechanism, demonstrated in Colorado: a city's own settings are not the only thing that determines who searches its cameras.[7][3]
Flock: a federal pilot it had denied
After months of public assurances that it did not work with federal immigration authorities, Flock acknowledged that federal agents had direct access to local police data through a pilot program, confirmed only after outside reporting forced the issue.[8]
Columbine Valley: the wrong woman
In September 2025 a Columbine Valley officer came to a Denver woman's home and accused her of package theft, saying he had tracked her car using Flock cameras belonging to the Town of Bow Mar. He had misidentified her. The summons was withdrawn and the officer sent to training. It is a small case that shows how far a plate hit travels before anyone checks it.[4]
Texas: tracking a woman seeking an abortion
An October 2025 Electronic Frontier Foundation investigation documented Texas sheriff's deputies using Flock data to track a woman seeking an out-of-state abortion, one of the cases most cited by Colorado residents objecting to their own cities' contracts.[4]
Nationally: officers using the system to stalk
In August 2026 The Washington Post reported on police officers across the country using Flock's plate cameras and trackers as stalking tools.[3]
Boulder: sued over the cameras, and the records
In December 2025 a Colorado man asked Boulder police, under the Criminal Justice Records Act, for the Flock images of the vehicle he drives. The department refused to run the search: “Our systems may only be accessed for law enforcement purposes as part of documented criminal investigations.” In May 2026 he and a second plaintiff filed a class action against Boulder's police chief and records custodian, calling the city's 31-camera network “warrantless, suspicionless, dragnet surveillance.” The city has moved to dismiss; no court has yet ruled.[15][16]
None of these incidents happened in Arvada, and none of them involves Arvada personnel. They matter to Arvada for a structural reason. In most of them the agency whose cameras were searched was not the agency doing the searching, and often did not know until afterward. That is a property of the network, not of any particular department's good faith, which is why the sharing settings rather than the department's intentions are what residents need to see. One published finding does reach Arvada's own settings: in September 2025, CBS News Colorado named Arvada among the Colorado agencies that “allow law enforcement nationwide to search their cameras.”[19]
Arvada's 2025 contract does contain a protection some cities lack: Flock may not hand over footage under “an immigration subpoena that has not been authorized by a federal court.” But that clause governs Flock's own disclosures. The Denver and Loveland searches did not run through Flock's legal department. They ran through the network, and the network appears on Arvada's order form.[14]
The law that exists, and the one that died
SB25-276: in force
Signed May 23, 2025, Senate Bill 25-276 bars state and local governments from making personal identifying information available for federal civil immigration enforcement, except under a judicial warrant, subpoena or court order. Under Colorado law, license plate data falls inside that protected category, which places every municipal ALPR network in the state, Arvada's included, within the statute's reach.[9] Arvada's ALPR policy, PM 460, took effect nineteen days later and does not mention it; see The Policies.
SB26-070: killed
The bipartisan Senate Bill 26-070 would have supplied the operational rules the state still lacks:
- a warrant requirement to search ALPR data more than 72 hours after the crime under investigation;
- a bar on most out-of-state data sharing;
- a ban on selling historical data;
- mandatory audits of who accessed the data;
- a 30-day retention cap absent an active investigation.
It cleared the Senate Judiciary Committee 5–2 on February 24, 2026, then died on the Senate floor in late April amid pushback from law enforcement agencies and a veto threat from Governor Jared Polis over the warrant provision.[11][12]
Arvada's public position on the bill came in a television interview. Deputy Chief Todd Reeves told CBS News Colorado in February 2026 that “there are times when it takes up to 10 days to get warrants signed,” and that if the bill passed the department would “have to make that evaluation of whether this is technology we can still afford.”[20] Two companion measures died the same spring. Senate Bill 26-071, the SAFE Act, a broader bill on police surveillance technology, was postponed indefinitely in Senate Judiciary on May 6, 2026, and House Bill 26-1037, a ban on government purchase of personal data from third parties, was postponed indefinitely in House Judiciary on April 22, 2026.[21][22]
Because SB26-070 failed, Colorado has no statewide standard for how long plate data may be kept, who may search it, whether searches must be audited, or whether out-of-state agencies may reach it. Those terms are set contract by contract, city by city. Arvada's are the ones in its contract and in PM 460: 364 days for patrol-car reads, sharing “at any time,” audits that “should” happen. Those are the only rules that apply to Arvada's cameras, and no public body has voted on them.
The Boulder lawsuit: testing the rules that remain
What the legislature declined to write, a court is now being asked to read. The Boulder class action puts two questions in front of a Colorado judge. Does a municipal Flock network violate the state constitution's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures? And may a police department refuse to search its own plate-reader data for a citizen because its vendor contract reserves the system for law-enforcement use? Boulder's motion to dismiss argues the Criminal Justice Records Act “does not require custodians to generate a record for release.”[15]
Both questions reach Arvada. Its 2023 Flock agreement limits access to “the awareness, prevention, and prosecution of crime, bona fide investigations by police departments, and archiving for evidence gathering,” and PM 460 declares plate data “not open to public review.”[13][18]
What leaving looks like
Denver is the nearest worked example. Its council unanimously rejected a two-year, $666,600 Flock extension in May 2025; Mayor Mike Johnston extended the expired contract himself for $498,500 that July, using a budget provision to stay under the council approval threshold; the public found out weeks later. In February 2026 Johnston announced the city would drop Flock for Axon, and by March all 110 cameras were removed.[4][5][10]
Lakewood, next door, is the other. Its contract, like Arvada's, was signed by the police chief and never voted on. The first time the question reached City Council, on September 21, 2026, council voted unanimously not to renew.[17]
By the fall of 2026 the statewide ledger was long. Fort Collins, Steamboat Springs, Moffat County and Englewood had cancelled Flock contracts; Denver, Douglas County, Longmont and Durango had switched to Axon; Englewood then deadlocked on an Axon replacement of its own; Commerce City went the other way and approved a $4.5 million Flock contract in April. The statewide survey that reported those decisions, published September 25, 2026, does not mention Arvada at all.[23]
Switching vendors is not the same as ending surveillance, and Denver residents said so at the time. Axon and Motorola operate similar data-sharing models; a city can change logos and keep the architecture. Metro residents, Westword reported, “aren't happy with either option.”[3] And Arvada has a second plate-reader system, Genetec's in-car readers, whose data a LexisNexis copy already reaches. Ending the Flock contract would not touch it. Fixing the problem the Loveland case exposed means writing the terms, retention, sharing, audits and warrants, not just changing the supplier.
Sources for this page
- “As AI license plate readers spread across Colorado, grassroots movements push back,” The Colorado Sun, April 27, 2026; and “Colorado bill to limit license plate reader data access passes Senate committee,” Colorado Newsline, February 24, 2026. coloradosun.com
- Flock Camera Locations, Colorado page, citing OpenStreetMap community contributions, snapshot dated August 15, 2026. flockcameralocations.com
- Sage Kelley, “Flock AI camera discussions send Lakewood into tizzy,” Westword, August 11, 2026. westword.com
- Bennito L. Kelty, “Are You Part of the Flock? How Cities Across the Denver Area Use AI Tracking Tech,” Westword, 2026. westword.com
- “Denver removes all 110 Flock license plate reader cameras as contract expires,” 9News. 9news.com
- “Frequent immigration-related searches of Denver Flock camera data revealed in logs,” Colorado Newsline, August 6, 2025. coloradonewsline.com
- “Records reveal Loveland Police shared access to license plate reader data with Border Patrol,” KRDO, August 18, 2025. krdo.com
- “Flock admits federal immigration agents have direct access to tracking data, despite previous claims,” 9News. 9news.com
- Colorado Senate Bill 25-276, “Protect Civil Rights Immigration Status,” signed May 23, 2025. leg.colorado.gov; see also the Colorado Immigrant Rights Coalition's summary, coloradoimmigrant.org.
- “Denver fires Flock, prepares to switch to new roadway surveillance system,” Denverite, February 24, 2026. denverite.com
- “Colorado bill to limit license plate reader data access passes Senate committee,” Colorado Newsline, February 24, 2026. coloradonewsline.com
- “Colorado lawmakers kill bill to limit police use of Flock camera data,” Colorado Newsline, April 29, 2026; “Under veto threat, Colorado lawmakers kill bill limiting police use of Flock camera data,” Sentinel Colorado. coloradonewsline.com
- City of Arvada / Flock Group Inc., Services Agreement Order Form and Government Agency Agreement, March 2023, obtained under the Colorado Open Records Act. PDF
- City of Arvada / Flock Group Inc., Master Services Agreement, signed December 3 and 9, 2025, obtained under CORA. PDF
- Jeffrey A. Roberts, “Are Flock camera images of your own vehicle available under Colorado public records laws?” Colorado Freedom of Information Coalition, August 2026. coloradofoic.org
- Class-action complaint, Freeman et al. v. Redfearn et al., Boulder County District Court, filed May 27, 2026; via Courthouse News: complaint (PDF) and “Boulder police chief faces class action over Flock cameras' warrantless surveillance,” Courthouse News, May 27, 2026, courthousenews.com
- City of Lakewood, City Council meeting of September 21, 2026, official meeting recording. youtube.com
- Arvada Police Department, Policy Manual PM 460, “Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR),” effective June 11, 2025, §460.2, obtained under CORA. DOCX
- Shaun Boyd, “Crime fighter or mass surveillance? In Colorado, license plate readers are high-tech and widespread,” CBS News Colorado, September 22, 2025. cbsnews.com
- Shaun Boyd, “Debate over police surveillance and Flock cameras moves to Colorado State Capitol,” CBS News Colorado, February 20, 2026. cbsnews.com
- Colorado Senate Bill 26-071, “Use of Surveillance Technology by Law Enforcement” (the SAFE Act). leg.colorado.gov
- Colorado House Bill 26-1037, “Ban Government Purchase of Personal Data from Third Party.” leg.colorado.gov
- Nicholas Fogleman, “Ditch or switch? Colorado governments decide fate of Flock cameras,” The Gazette, September 25, 2026. gazette.com